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AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

Volume 27 , Number 2, April 1990

GOD, THE DEMON, AND
THE STATUS OF THEODICIES
Edward Stein

THE problem of evil is an ancient one for theists.

overwhelming goodness in the world, thereby challenging the demonist to explain how the existence
of the demon is consistent with such goodness. The
demonist can offer a variety of responses to the
problem of good which I shall call demonodicies,
dispensing with, for reasons of aesthetics and symmetry, Cahn' s term "cacodaemonodicies." The
demonist may say that good provides a necessary
contrast to evil. Or she might offer a free will defense of demonism, arguing that the demon, in order
to maximize the amount of evil in the world, gave
people free will, knowing that although they would
sometimes choose good acts, the evil acts which
they committed would be worse than merely predetermined evil acts. Finally, the demonist could always fall back on the "last defense" that human
beings, in their limited frame of reference, may
think there is good in the world, but that the demon,
who can see the entire picture, knows that in the long
run , all apparently good things are, in fact, evil.
Cahn, Madden and Hare have argued that the
demonist can construct a demonodicy which is
isomorphic with any theodicy. I agree in generalthis can be accomplished simply by substituting
the word "good" for the word "evil" and the words
"a demon" for the word "God." This inversion
process will produce a demonodicy for every theodicy. Since the demonist can use inversion to create
demonodicies which are analogous to theodicies,
the problems of good and evil are isomorphic-both
are either soluble or insoluble. This is the
interesting point which Cahn, Madden and Hare
make. I want, however, to take the notion of a
demon and use it to make a deeper and stronger
argument than one that merely establishes that
every theodicy is in the same boat with its isomorphic demonodicy. My strategy is to move from a
theodicy, which is an argument that God is consistent with the amount of evil in the world, to an

How is it possible for an omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent being to exist in a world which
clearly contains evil? A major element of every
theistic philosophy is a theodicy, an attempt to
reconcile this apparent contradiction. Steven Cahn,
Edward Madden and Peter Hare discuss a series of
concepts isomorphic to the traditional theistic
notions of God, the problem of evil, and theodicies
with an eye towards raising problems for theism. 1
These concepts relate to a malevolent, rather than
a benevolent, deity, not a god, but a demon. In
this paper, I will argue that the notion of a demon
is far more powerful than these three philosophers
have suggested; in fact, arguments based on the
demon create serious problems for the entire project
of giving a rational defense of theism.
Atheists frequently raise the problem of evil as a
challenge to proofs for the existence of an omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good supernatural being.
The argument from evil asserts that it would be inconsistent for an all-knowing, all-powerful , allgood god to exist in the same world as evil: if God is
really all-powerful, then he could prevent evil; if
God is really all-good, then he would prevent evil.
In response to this argument, theists have developed
theodicies, attempts to explain away this apparent
inconsistency. Atheists try to find flaws in many of
these theodicies, and thus the debate over the problem of evil persists, with no acknowledged victor.
Cahn, Madden and Hare have a strategy for expanding this debate. They ask us to consider the
possibility of an omnimalevolent supernatural being,
which I shall call the demon. I shall call someone
who believes in the demon a demonist. How might
someone who does not believe in the existence of
the demon (an ademonist) argue that the demon does
not exist? The ademonist could make an argument
from good by offering illustrative examples of the
163
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argument for the actual existence of a supernatural
being with certain attributes. I want to argue that
any theist who puts forth an argument for the existence of an omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent god has three tasks before her: argue for the
possible existence of God, argue for the consistency
of God with the amount of evil in the world, and
show that these arguments are not invertible into
isomorphic arguments for the existence and consistency of a demon (a task which I think that no
current theist has accomplished). In other words,
I am emphasizing that arguments for the consistency and existence of God must include arguments
against the existence and consistency of the demon.
To begin, I shall divide the arguments for the
existence of God into two categories: ethical arguments and ontological arguments. Ethical arguments
are those that attempt to prove the ethical nature
(i.e., the goodness or badness) of an omniscient and
omnipotent being. Ethical arguments (not to be confused with argument in ethics), to be successful,
must explain away any apparent contradictions between the ethical nature of the relevant supernatural
being and the perceived amount of good (in the case
of the demon) or evil (in the case of God) in the
world. In contrast, ontological arguments are those
that attempt to prove that an omnipotent, omniscient
being exists. The theist and the demonist may agree
on ontological arguments, for they both believe in
the existence of an omnipotent and omniscient being.
They are, however, at odds with respect to ethical
arguments. This is where the isomorphism enters
the picture: any ethical argument ofthe theist can be
inverted into an ethical argument for the demonist.
Because of this isomorphism, no ethical argument
for the existence of a benevolent supernatural being
provides any reason for thinking that such a being
exists rather than a malevolent one. Where there is
isomorphism, there are no ethical arguments that
successfully establish either the goodness of God or
the badness of a demon. The theist wants to argue
for the existence of God, but his ethical arguments
are isomorphic with ethical arguments for a demon.
This isomorphism in effect neutralizes the theist's
(and, for that matter, the demonist's) ethical arguments. Without successful ethical arguments, the
theist has no successful arguments for the existence
of God. The theist's arguments will fail unless they

demonstrate not only that God is compatible with this
world, but that the demon is not similarly compatible.
A possible response to this approach would be to
deny that arguments about supernatural beings can
be neatly divided between ethical and ontological arguments; there might be "hybrid" arguments
which are both ethical and ontological. My response
would be to distinguish between the ethical consequences of each premise of an argument and its o~tological consequences. The theist and the demonist
would argue for the same ontological consequences
but they would argue for different (though isomorphic) ethical consequences. This would preserve
the above result that the theist's arguments (even if
they were "hybrid" arguments) would fail to accomplish the third task facing the theist, namely
showing that theistic arguments are not invertible
into isomorphic demonistic arguments.
While Cahn, Madden and Hare only conclude
that the arguments from evil and good are of the
same status, my conclusion amounts to a rejection
of all current versions of theism on the grounds that
they do not show that the demon is not similarly
compatible with the amount of evil in the world; in
other words, no current version of theism makes
successful arguments about the ethical nature of the
supernatural being that theists claim exists. For
theism to succeed, there must be an argument that
God is consistent with the amount of good and evil
in the world, while the demon is not. In other words,
theism requires a non-invertible ethical argument
and an associated theodicy, something which no
current version of it offers. This is not to say that
a complete and strong version of theism is impossible; rather, it is a claim that no such version of
theism has been suggested thus far and a challenge
to theists to try to suggest one.
One objection to this strategy, similar to one
made by John King-Farlow2 , is that a theistic answer
to the problem of evil tries to establish the consistency of God with the amount of evil in the world,
not that there is a high probability that God exists.
The objection claims that Cahn, Madde.n and Hare
pose no threat to theodicies because they show only
that demonodicies are successful if theodicies are,
not that theodicies are unsuccessful. Theodicies are
designed to show that the existence of God and evil
in the same world is consistent; showing that a
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demon and good can also exist consistently in the
same world does no damage to the force of
theodicies. The objection is right that the
isomorphism argument does not, by itself, disprove
the existence of God, and that, as far as the conclusion reached by Cahn, Madden and Hare is concerned, the theist is safe. That is, their arguments
show that if God's existence is consistent with the
amount of good and evil in the world, then so is
the demon's. The objection does not show, however, that nothing more can be accomplished by
the isomorphism argument. In fact, I argued above
that the isomorphism blocks both the theist and the
demonist from making successful ethical arguments. This objection does, however, nicely show
the difference between the conclusion of Cahn,
Madden and Hare that theism and demonism are
equally plausible and my conclusion that no currently espoused version of theism is adequate since
none makes any successful ethical arguments.
A more specific objection concerns the invertibility of the free will theodicy . Cahn offers a sketch of
the free will demonodicy, one of the demonist' s possible responses to the problem of good. According
to this inversion, in order to achieve the maximum
amount of evil, the demon has given human beings
free will so that they can choose to act evilly. A
world containing only people who freely choose to
do evil would be more evil than a world in which
people were predetermined always to do evil. The
world under the demon is thus "a place of 'soulbreaking, • in which free human beings, by grappling
with the exhausting tasks and challenges of their
existence [can] have their spirits broken" (Cahn,
p. 72). In response to the ademonist challenge that
the evil in the world does not nullify all the good,
the demonist, using the free will demonodicy, could
respond by referring to future evil so great that all
previous good used to set the stage for it would be
nullified. Finally, if asked why the demon does
not reveal himself to the world, the demonist can
explain that the demon needs epistemic distance in
order to trick us into believing there is hope for
better times.
This account is, however, open to the objection
that the free will theodicy cannot be successfully
inverted . The structure of the free will demonodicy
can be laid out as follows:

(I)
(2)
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It is worse for people to choose to act evilly than
it is if they are predetermined to act evilly.
Therefore, if the demon wants to maximize evil,
he should give people free will.

But this demonodicy contains the following
implicit assumption:
(3)

If any undesired good is generated by the demon
giving people free will, it will be cancelled out
by the evil generated when people act evilly.

While (2) follows from (1) and (3), it does not
follow from (1) alone, because if (3) is false, the
free will demonodicy will not work since if free will
makes the world a better one, then the demon would
not choose to give people free will. Thus, if (3) if
false, then the apparent contradiction of having the
demon and good existing in the same world is not
explained.
Under what conditions might (3) be false? (3)
might be false if:
(4a) Free will is intrinsically good.

If (4a) is true, then the free will demonodicy
will fail to be isomorphic with the free will theodicy, for the free will theodicy need not consider
the possibility that the intrinsic goodness of free
will might cancel out the evil caused by people
who freely choose evil acts. There are two other
possible situations which might hold with respect
to free will, namely:
(4b) Free will is intrinsically evil.
(4c) Free will is neither intrinsically good nor intrinsically evil, i.e, free will is neutral.

The intuitions of most people favor (4a); that is,
most people believe that free will is good. Weighing
all the respective merits of the (4)'s is beyond the
scope of this article. I will therefore attempt only
to examine the relevant consequences of (4a), (4b)
and (4c), remaining agnostic about which is true.
If (4c) is true, then the isomorphism between·
the free will theodicy and the free will demonodicy
holds. But, if (4a) is true, then the isomorphism
may be threatened, because if free will is intrinsically good, then the free will demonodicist will
have to show that the evil created by having people
opt for evil is greater than the intrinsic good of just
having free will . This is not to say that the free will
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demonodicist would be unable to do so; the crucial
point, however, is that the free will theodicist will
not have this same problem, because the intrinsic
good of free will (if (4a) is true) will not cancel
out or take away from the good created by having
people opt for good-quite the opposite, in fact.
An isomorphic problem will occur if (4b) is true.
If free will is intrinsically evil, then the free will
demonodicy and the free will theodicy will fail to
be isomorphic for almost the same reasons they
fail to be so if (4a) is true. Namely, the free will
theodicy will have the problem that the good which
people commit freely might be cancelled out by
the intrinsic evil of free will, a problem the free
will demonodicy will not have. By arguing for
either (4a) or (4b), one could claim that the
isomorphism fails between the free will theodicy
and the free will demonodicy.
Despite this objection, I think there are two ways
in which the isomorphism between the free will
theodicy and the free will demonodicy can be preserved. First, the isomorphism is preserved if, for
the same reason, both strategies fail to explain away
the apparent contradictions which are pointed out
by the arguments from evil and good. The free will
theodicy might fail because God could have chosen
to actualize a world (call it W 1 ) in which people
have free will and they always choose to perform
good actions. Being omniscient and thus being able
to survey all possible worlds, God had the ability
to choose any world from among an infinite number
of possible worlds. Why should he have chosen
the actual world, a world in which people freely
choose to act evilly, when he could have actualized
a world where people always choose to act good?
If God is really all-good, then he would have chosen
to actualize world W 1 . But clearly he did not (since
people do choose to act evilly in this world), therefore the problem of evil remains. Similarly, the
free will demonodicy might fail because the demon
could have actualized the world in which people
have free will and they always choose to act evilly
(call it W 2 ). The demon also was able to choose
among an infinite number of possible worlds. If
he is really all-evil, he would have chosen to
actualize world W2 . But clearly he did not, (since
people do perform good acts), and therefore the
problem of good remains. If both strategies fail for

the reasons above, then the free will theodicy is
invertible and the isomorphism is preserved despite
the objection that the free will theodicy is not invertible. There are arguments, however, against this
approach to the free will theodicy and settling this
specific issue about free will and supernatural
beings is beyond the scope of this paper.
Fortunately, I think that there is a better way to
preserve the isomorphism. To review the present
status of the argument, I am considering whether the
free will demonodicy is really isomorphic with the
free will theodicy. The particular issue under consideration is whether free will is intrinsically good.
If free will is intrinsically good, then the isomorphism between the free will demonodicy and the free
will theodicy will fail because the demonodicy will
have to deal with the possibility that the good of
having free will might cancel out the evil created by
people choosing to act evilly. This failure threatens
to break down the general isomorphism between
theodicies and demonodicies.
Underlying this argument against the invertibility
of the free will theodicy is the assumption that free
will must be all or nothing. But I think this is false.
We can certainly make sense of varying degrees of
free will. For example, while we may be freelychoosing beings in some sense, clearly we cannot
choose our biological parents and we cannot control
our subconscious. But God or the demon could have
given us such powers. We can imagine a world
where agents have a much greater amount of free
will and can control, for example, their subconscious. (The examples do not particularly matterwhat does matter is that there can be varying degrees
of free will.) Since there can be varying degrees of
free will, I think the isomorphism can be saved,
because while the demonist may have to explain
why the demon granted people some amount of
free will, the theist will have the opposite problem:
why did God not grant people complete free will
or at least make them freer than he actually did?
If a person had more free will then he does in the
actual world and he chose to do good, this would
be an even greater good than a person with less
free will choosing to do so. The general point is
that the free will theodicist and the free will
demonodicist, if they admit that there is evil and
good in the world and if they use free will to explain
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how evil and good can exist in the same world
with God (or the demon), both have the additional
burden of explaining why the creator gave people the particular amount of free will that he did.
For this reason, the isomorphism is preserved.
In conclusion, I have argued, with Cahn,
Madden and Hare, there is a demonodicy isomor-
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phic to every theodicy and that the problems of
good and evil are either both soluble or both
insoluble. Further, I have argued that this isomorphism threatens all current versions of theism
(and demonism) because it blocks all known
arguments for the goodness of a supernatural
being. 3
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